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ARGUMENT

I.

YOUNG LIVING'S "INTEGRATION CLAUSE" DOES NOT INSULATE IT
FROM THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly recognized that a

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may result
from an obligation, express or implied, which arises not from the
language of the contract, but from the course of dealings and
conduct of the parties.

See, e.g., Rawson

24, f 44, 20 P.3d 876; Brown

1998); St. Benedicts

v.

Dev. v. St.

200 (Utah 1991); and Andolex
1041, 1048 (Utah App. 1994).

Moore,

2001 UT

973 P.2d 950, 955 (Utah

Benedicts

Resources,

v. Conover,

Hosp.,
Inc.

v.

811 P.2d 194,
Myers,

871 P.2d

For example, in Brown the Supreme

Court explained that
"[i]n determining whether a party has breached the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, we are not limited to an
examination of the express contractual provisions; we will
also consider the course of dealing between the parties."
973 P.2d at 954 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
Nevertheless, Young Living fails to address this line of
cases and asserts that the trial court properly refused to
consider the parties' conduct and course of dealings in the case
at bar because the agreement at issue contains a "clear
integration clause."
Tangren

Family

Trust

Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
v.

Tangren,

2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326, Young

Living contends that "[i]f there is a clear integration clause,

1

the parties' course of dealing may not be used to add implied
terms."1

Young Living's reliance is misplaced.

Tangren

is easily distinguishable from the case at bar.

That case did not involve a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and it did not address

the Rawson,

Brown,

line of cases.

St.

Benedicts

Development,

Andolex

More importantly, as the Tangren

Resources

Court

recognized, the parol evidence rule has a "very narrow
application," and operates only to exclude evidence of statements
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated agreement.

Id.

Instruments

Inc.,

& Control,

at 1 11 (quoting Hall

v.

Process

890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995)).

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, inheres in
every contract as a matter of law.
Bradley,

See,

e.g.,

2007 UT App 379, 1 18, 173 P.3d 865.

Markham

v.

Because the

covenant was already part of the contract at issue in this case,
it follows that Mr. Marin's testimony in support of his claim for
breach of the covenant was not "offered for the purpose of
varying or adding to the terms of" the contract.
The trial court, therefore, erred in concluding that the
parol evidence rule barred Mr. Marin's testimony.

1

Brief of Appellee at p. 14.
2

II.

MR. MARIN'S TESTIMONY DOES NOT LACK FOUNDATION.
Young Living also relies on the trial court's statement that

Mr. Marin's "assertions of Plaintiff's representations lack
foundation as to the circumstances including who made the
purported representation or representations and when such
representations were made."2

Unfortunately, Young Living fails

to provide any analysis, explanation or support for this
statement.
In point of fact, Mr. Marin's testimony is, for the most
part, very clear as to who made the representations and when they
were made:

4 . ... plaintiff represented to me that it was nearing
completion of a new mainstream marketing website, recruiting
DVD, audio CD, and other marketing materials (hereinafter
referred to as the "marketing tools"). It was clearly
understood by both plaintiff and myself that these marketing
tools would be absolutely necessary in order for me to be
able to meet my performance guarantees under the Agreement
and it was represented to me that they would be available
for use by February 1, 2005.

7. On or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed
to provide the marketing tools as promised, I contacted Gary
Young, plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David
Stirling, plaintiffs' Chief Operating Officer, with my
growing concerns about my ability to meet the performance
guarantees. Mr. Young and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that
plaintiff had failed to perform as promised, assured me that
my inability to satisfy the performance guarantees would not

2

Brief of Appellee at p. 17-18 (quoting from the trial
court's March 26, 2008 Order (R. 462)).
3

iffeet my receipt of the advance payment of $25,000 due
'ebruary 15, 2005, and expressed their confidence that the
larketing tools would be ready for my use by mid-February to
>arly March 2005.
8. On or about March 16, 2005, Steve Bentley,
laintiff's Chief Financial Officer, informed me that due to
y failure to meet the March 15, 2005 performance guarantee,
laintiff was considering withholding further payment to me
nder the Agreement. In response, I made it very clear to
r. Bentley that my failure to satisfy the performance
uarantee was the unavoidable result of plaintiff s failure
o provide the promised marketing tools, that I could and
ould meet my performance guarantees when the tools were
rovided, and that I expected plaintiff to continue making
ayment to me in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.
r. Bentley acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to
erform as promised, represented that plaintiff anticipated
hat its website would be completed within approximately two
aeks, and stated that plaintiff would be making a partial
15,000 payment to me.
9. On April 12, 2005, I spoke again with Gary Young
sgarding plaintiff s failure to provide the marketing
DOIS.
Mr. Young responded by telling me that he would "get
3 the bottom" of the problem and see what he could do.
10. Despite its acknowledgment that it had failed to
rovide me with the marketing tools which I needed to do my
3b, and despite its requests that I remain patient while it
)ntinued in its efforts to provide the marketing tools,
Laintiff failed to pay me $10,000 of the advance payment
ae March 15, 2005 in accordance with paragraph 4 of the
jreement and failed to make any of the $25,000 advance
lyment due to be paid to me on April 15, 2005.
11. On April 26, 2005, I telephoned Mr. Stirling
jgarding plaintiff's failure to provide the promised
irketing tools. Mr. Stirling again assured me that they
mid be provided soon and again requested my patience.
12. On May 3, 2007, Mr. Stirling notified me that he
id received an e-mail from Rainmaker Consulting (i.e.,
rohn's folks) "which indicated they are making progress" on
ie website. Mr. Stirling asked me to "hold tight". A copy
the e-mail is attached hereto. Thus, 49 days after
aintiff stopped making payments to me in accordance with
4

the Agreement, plaintiff acknowledged that it had still not
provided me with the marketing tools which were absolutely
essential for me to be able to do my job and again requested
my continued patience.
13. On or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still
not provided any of the marketing tools which I needed in
order to do my job, I spoke with Mr. Young and informed him
that I believed I had been patient long enough in waiting
for the repeatedly promised marketing tools and that I could
no longer afford to continue to my contractual relationship
with plaintiff.
(R. 0125-0122)(emphasis added).
Even if there is some foundational problem with Mr. Marin's
testimony, for purposes of opposing summary judgment the
nonmoving party need not produce evidence "in a form that would
be admissible at trial," so long as the content and substance of
the evidence would be admissible.
Business
Celotex

Machines,
Corp.

v.

v.

International

48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Catret,

All

(1986), and citing Winskunas
(7th Cir. 1994)).

Thomas

U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553
v.

Birnbaum,

23 F.3d 1264, 1267-68

For example, hearsay testimony and

generalized, unsubstantiated, non-personal affidavits are not
sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Id.

(citations omitted).

Mr. Marin's testimony does not suffer from any of these
deficiencies.

It is not hearsay because it is based upon

admissions by a party-opponent, Utah Rule

of

Evidence

801(d)(2),

and it is clearly based upon his own personal, specific
knowledge.

5

Accordingly, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that his
testimony is sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
III. THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.
Young Living does not attempt to defend the trial court's
award of $43,903 in attorney fees in this relatively simple
breach of contract case in which neither party conducted any
discovery and which was decided on summary judgment.

Nor does

Young Living attempt to justify its failure to "categorize the
time and fees expended for ^successful claims for which there may
be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for
which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims
been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement
to attorney fees.'" Jensen
325 (quoting Foote v.

v.

Clark,

Sawyers,

2005 UT 81, 5132, 130 P.3

962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998).

Finally, Young Living does not explain why it is entitled to
thousands of dollars in attorney fees incurred in connection with
matters upon which it did not prevail.

See

Foote

v.

Clark,

962

P.2d 52, 57 (Utah 1998)("the court should not reimburse counsel
for time spent pursuing ungrounded and infeasible theories of
recovery); and Gardner

v.

Madsen,

949 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah Ct.

App. 1997)(trial court should make adjustments to fee request so
that the prevailing party "does not recover fees attributable to
issues on which he did not prevail").

Instead, Young Living

relies on Rule 7(f)(2) to support its contention that Mr. Marin

6

failed to preserve the issue of attorney fees for appeal.

Mr.

Marin respectfully submits that Young Living misreads the Rules.
Mr. Marin believes that the following time-line may be
helpful to understanding the flaw in Young Living's argument.
1. The Order granting Young Living's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was entered March 26, 2008.

(R. 462)

That

Order, however, was not a final judgment because it
"adjudicat[ed] fewer than all [of Young Living's] claims."

Rule

54 (b) , URCP.
2. Accordingly, on May 27, 2008, Young Living filed the
following documents with the trial court:
a. Motion for Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action
b. Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action
c. Proposed Final Judgment
d. Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs
(R. 492, 502 and 505)
3. In accordance with Rules 6(a), 6(e), and 7(c)(1), URCP,
Mr. Marin had until June 13, 2008, in which to file his
memorandum in response to Young Living's Motion for Order of
Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Sixth Causes of Action.
4. Mr. Marin timely filed his objection to Young Living's
attorney fee affidavit and to the provision for attorney fees and

7

Judgment on June

Dung Living's
;if f's Second,
:>n June 13, 2008.

Dort of
sal on June 23,

rial court
ssal of
:h Causes of
: did so not only
"andum, but prior
was due, prior
and without
<r Decision" in

r submitted with
irected by the
fteen days after
arties a
s decision,
led within five
order shall
th an objection

Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

In support of its contention that Mr. Marin failed to
preserve the issue of attorney fees for appeal, Young Living
relies on the Rule 7(f)(2) requirement that "[o]bjections to the
proposed order shall be filed within five days after service."
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that Young Living misreads the
Rule.

The "five day" requirement applies only to orders served

upon the other parties within "fifteen days after the court's
decision" and does not apply to a "proposed order submitted with
an initial memorandum."

This is so for a number of reasons.

First, it does not make sense that an objection to a "proposed
order submitted with an initial memorandum" would be required to
be filed in half the time allowed by Rule 7(c)(1), URCP, in which
to file a memorandum in response to the initial memorandum
itself.

Second, Rule 7(f)(2) specifically excludes from its time

limitations those situations like the case at bar where "the
court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum."

Third, the time; for filing objections contained in

the second sentence of Rule 7(f)(2) runs from the time of
"service," it does not run from the time a proposed order is
"submitted" within an initial memorandum:
... the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after
the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a
proposed order in conformity with the court's decision.
Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five
days after service.

9

Rule 7(f) (2) , URCP.3
In short, Rule 7(f)(2) does not specify a time limitation
for filing an objection to a "proposed order submitted with an
initial memorandum," and it would not be reasonable to interpret
that Rule to require an objection to a proposed order submitted
with an initial memorandum to be filed in half the time allowed
for filing a response to the initial memorandum itself.
Accordingly, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that his objection to
Young Living's fee affidavit and the award of attorney fees
contained in the Proposed Final Judgment (which was filed two
days prior to the deadline for responding to Young Living's
motion) was timely filed.
However, even if Young Living is correct that Mr. Marin's
objections were filed later than required by Rule 7, they were
still sufficient to preserve the issue of attorney fees for
appeal.

In Groberg

v.

Housing

Opportunities,

Inc.,

2003 UT App

67, 68 P.3d 1015, the Court explained that "for an issue to be
sufficiently raised ... it must at least be raised to a level of

3

It is likewise clear that the time limits set forth in the
final sentence of Rule 7(f)(2) apply only to proposed orders
"served" within fifteen days after the court's decision, and do
not apply to proposed orders "submitted" with an initial
memorandum: "The party preparing the order shall file the
proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon
expiration of the time to object." It would, of course, be
absurd to read the final sentence to require the filing of a
proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum again "upon
being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to
object."
10

consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it."
f 19 (quotations and citations omitted).

Id.

at

Two policy

considerations underlie the rule that issues not raised before
the trial court may not be raised on appeal:
First, the rule exists to give the trial court an
opportunity to address the claimed error. [quotations and
citations omitted] Second, requiring preservation of an
issue prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial for
strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if the
strategy fails.
Tschaggeny

v.

Millbank

Ins.

Co.,

2007 UT 37, f 20, 163 P.3d 615.

In the instant case, there is no suggestion that Mr. Marin
failed to earlier object to plaintiff's attorney fee request for
strategic reasons.

And, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that his

objection (filed two days prior to the issuance of the Final
Judgment) was sufficiently "raised to a level of consciousness
that the trial judge [could have] considered it."
supra,

2003 UT App 67, 1 19.

Groberg,

The issue of attorney fees was,

therefore, preserved for appeal.
IV.

THE COURT CAN CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AND THIS CASE INVOLVES
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
If the Court determines that Mr. Marin failed to preserve

the issue of attorney fees for appeal, it may still consider the
issue of fees because the trial court committed plain error and
this case involves exceptional circumstances.
Condominium

Owners

Ass'n

v.

MSICO,

11

See

View

2004 UT App 104, 1 37, 90 P.3d

1042 (citing State

v. Brown,

856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah Ct. App.

1993)) (appellate courts will generally not consider an issue
raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional
circumstances).
(A)

The Trial Court's Award of Attorney Fees is Plainly
Erroneous.
(i)

The trial court failed to make findings of fact
supported by the evidence and appropriate
conclusions of law.

"An award of attorney fees must generally be made on the
basis of findings of fact supported by the evidence and
appropriate conclusions of law."

Cabrera

622, 624 (Utah 1985)(citing Bangerter

v.

v.

Poulton,

103 (Utah 1983))(other citations omitted).
before the Court in Cabrera

Cottrell,

694 P.2d

663 P.2d 100,

One of the issues

was whether the trial court committed

plain error in awarding attorney fees without making a finding of
reasonableness.

The Court upheld the award even though the trial

court did not enter findings and conclusions separate from its
order and judgment because the order and judgment itself
contained findings and legal conclusions, including a finding
that the fee award was reasonable.

The Court explained that:

As a matter of form, it would have been preferable for the
trial court to have entered separate findings of fact and
conclusions of law in addition to the order and judgment for
attorney fees, but the order and judgment are not defective
because they are combined with findings and conclusions.

12

694 P.2d at 625.
In the case at bar, however, the trial court did not make
any findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to Young
Living's attorney fee request.

And, unlike Cabrera,

there is no

finding of reasonableness in the Final Judgment.
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the trial court
committed plain error by awarding attorney fees without making
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(ii) Young Living is not entitled to recover attorney
fees related to its tort and other non-contract
claims.
In Utah, attorney fees are recoverable only if authorized by
statute or contract.

Dixie

State

Bank

988 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).

v.

Bracken,

764 P.2d 985,

Young Living relies on the

following contractual provision to support its fee request:
6.1

MARIN hereby agrees to indemnify and save Company and
hold Company harmless in respect to all causes of
action, liabilities, costs, charges and expenses, loss
and damage (including consequential loss) suffered or
incurred by Company (including legal fees) arising from
any willful or grossly negligent act or omission of
MARIN or his employees, servants and agents or arising
from contravention by MARIN of [sic] any of its [sic]
employees, servants, and agents of any of the terms and
conditions imposed on MARIN pursuant to this Agreement.

(R. 10)
In its Complaint, Young Living alleged six causes of action,
entitled in order: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Unjust Enrichment;
(3) Quantum'Meruit; (4) Fraud; (5) Breach of Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (6) Negligent Misrepresentation.
13

After the trial court granted summary judgment with respect to
the breach of contract claim alleged in its First Cause of
Action, Young Living voluntarily dismissed its Second through
Sixth Causes of Action.

Accordingly, the only cause of action

with respect to which Young Living might be entitled to an award
of attorney fees is the breach of contract claim alleged in the
First Cause of Action.
The trial court, however, granted summary judgment in Young
Living's favor on the breach of contract claim at the conclusion
of the hearing held October 1, 2007.

Yet, Young Living seeks to

recover tens of thousands of dollars in attorney fees incurred
during the eight months after that date (R. 470-465), nearly all
of which were related either to the tort and non-contract claims
alleged in the Second through Sixth Causes of Action or to
litigating "Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Form of
Order" and "Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider" upon which Young
Living did not prevail.
In Jensen

v.

Sawyers,

(R. 392, 448)
2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325, the Court

recognized not only that an award of attorney fees must be based
upon "specific findings of fact," but also that the party
requesting attorney fees must "categorize the time and fees
expended for 'successful claims for which there may be an
entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been

14

successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to
attorney fees.'" Id.

at 1132 (quoting Foote

v.

Clark,

962 P.2d

52, 54 (Utah 1998) .
Noncompliance with these requirements makes it difficult, if
not impossible, for the trial court to award the moving
party fees because there is insufficient evidence to support
the award.
Id.
Thus, in the case at bar, not only did the trial court
commit plain error by not making specific findings of fact, but
it did not have sufficient evidence to support an award of
attorney fees because Young Living failed to properly categorize
its fee request.
(iii) Young Living is not entitled to recover attorney
fees in connection with issues on which it did
not prevail.
The trial court committed plain error by awarding Young
Living attorney fees in connection with matters on which it did
not prevail.

See Foote

v.

Clark,

962 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah

1998)("the court should not reimburse counsel for time spent
pursuing ungrounded and infeasible theories of recovery); and
Gardner

v.

Madsen,

949 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(trial

court should make adjustments to fee request so that the
prevailing party "does not recover fees attributable to issues on
which he did not prevail") ., Young Living seeks thousands of
dollars in attorney fees incurred in litigating "Defendant's
Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Form of Order" and "Plaintiff's
15

Motion to Reconsider."

(R. 470-465)

The trial court, however,

sustained Mr. Marin's objections to Young Living's proposed form
of order (R. 392) and denied Young Living's Motion to Reconsider.
(R. 448)

Mr. Marin respectfully submits that it was plainly

erroneous for the trial court to reimburse Young Living for time
spent on ungrounded and infeasible theories and upon matters on
which it did not prevail.
(B) This Case Involves Exceptional Circumstances.
Finally, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the following
exceptional circumstances would justify the Court in considering
the issue of attorney fees.
1. Young Living failed to comply with the time requirements
of Rule 7, URCP, and should not be heard to complain of Mr.
Marin's failure to do so.

Young Living filed its Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment on March 21, 2007.

(R. 74)

Mr. Marin

timely filed his Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 4, 2007.
(R. 119)

Young Living did not file its reply/response memorandum

until August 13, 2007, nearly four months after it was due.

(R.

170)
Similarly, the Order granting Young Living's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment was entered March 26, 2008.

(R. 462)

In accordance with Rule 7(f)(2), Young Living should have served
a proposed form of judgment within "fifteen days after the

16

court's decision."

The Proposed Final Judgment was not served

until May 27, 2008, 44 days late.

(R. 505)

2. The trial court did not proceed in accordance with Rule
7, URCP.

As set forth above, the trial court prematurely entered

the Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action on June 12, 2008.
502)

(R.

It did so not only prior to the filing of Mr. Marin's

response memorandum, but prior to the time when Mr. Marin's
response memorandum was due, prior to the filing of plaintiff's
Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Voluntary
Dismissal on June 23, 2008 (R.510), and without either party
having filed a "Request to Submit for Decision" in accordance
with Rule 7(d), URCP.
Accordingly, because neither Young Living nor the trial
court proceeded in accordance with the requirements of Rule 7, it
would not be reasonable to now hold Mr. Marin strictly to those
requirements.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing additional reasons, Mr. Marin respectfully
requests that the trial court's March 26, 2008 Order granting
plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be reversed, that
the Final Judgment be vacated, and that this case be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
Court's decision.
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